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CASE NOTE ON CITGO ASPHALT REFINING CO. v.
FRESCATI SHIPPING CO., 140 S. CT. 1081 (2020)
YUANYUAN ZHANG
I. Introduction
Recently, in CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping. Co., the
Supreme Court resolved a long-term divergence among circuit courts, with
respect to whether the safe-berth clause in maritime contracts is a warranty of
safety; namely, should the party be held liable for breach of contract
regardless of fault.1 Circuit court cases focused on the customary operation
in the maritime industry.2 The majority in CITGO, however, focused on the
contract interpretation and held that the plain language of the subject contract
shows that the safe-berth clause constitutes a warranty of safety. 3 As the
majority clarified, contract liability is a strict liability.4 Unexpectedly, the
dissent in CITGO also focused on the contract interpretation, but interpreted
the original language of the subject contract in a different manner. 5

 Yuanyuan Zhang, JD Candidate 2022 of the University of Oklahoma College of Law,
obtained LLB degree from Renmin University of China and LLM degree from Beijing
Normal University, passed China’s Bar Exam in 2014.
1. 140 S. Ct. 1081 (2020).
2. See, eg. Orduna S.A. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 913 F.2d 1149, 1156-57 (5th Cir.
1990).
3. CITGO, 140 S. Ct. 1081.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1093–99.
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II. Applicable Law
A. Statute
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (hereinafter “OPA”) creates the cause of
subject action. 6 In order to speed up the cleanup process of oil spills, OPA
imposes a strict liability on the “responsible party” to pay cleanup costs,
without regard to fault. 7 If the responsible party paid the cleanup costs timely,
it will receive a reimbursement of the amount exceeding a statutory limit
from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, which is operated by the Federal
Government. 8 However, OPA allows the responsible party, as well as the
Federal Government, after paying the cleanup costs and the reimbursement,
to claim indemnification against any third parties who were at fault for the oil
spill incident.9
B. Common Law
First of all, applicable law for maritime contracts is the same contract law
just like any other contract.10 The contract in dispute is the charter of a ship:
Petitioner CITGO Asphalt Refining Company (“CARCO”) chartered the
M/T Athos I (“Athos I”), an oil tanker, by entering into contract with the
Athos I’s owner, Frescati Shipping Company (“Frescati”). As the subject
contract is not a contract for the exchange of goods, it applies to the common
law instead of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”).
The common law CITGO applies to, majorly concerning contract
interpretation, includes the law of introducing extrinsic evidence to show
what parties originally intended at the time of contract formation. Extrinsic
evidence is a broad description, and “parol evidence” is part of it, such as
“proof as to the subject matter of a contract, the relations existing between
the parties, the facts surrounding them at the time they entered into the
agreement, and the negotiations of the parties coincident with or just prior to
the execution of the contract.”11 Besides parol evidence, extrinsic evidence
also encompasses such as usage of trade, course of dealing, a course of
6. Public L. No. 101–380, 104 Stat. 484, 33 U.S.C.A. 2701–20, 2731–38, 2751–53,
2761–62 (West 2018).
7. CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1086–87 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a)).
8. CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1087 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2708, 2704).
9. CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1087 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 2710, 2751(e)).
10. CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1087–88. (citing Norfolk S. R. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd.,
543 U.S. 14, 31(2004) .
11. Rick J. Norman, 36 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 331, § 2 (Westlaw, December 2020
Update).
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performance, similar contract, internal document, statements made by parties,
and the circumstances or situation surrounding the making of a contract.12 In
applying this rule, courts generally determine whether there is an ambiguity
in the subject contract first, without aid of extrinsic evidence, and then allow
extrinsic evidence if the court finds an ambiguity exists.13
Second, the issue in CITGO regards to the law of warranty. Specifically to
the charter party agreement, warranty is a statement of fact in the contract
relating to some material matter. 14 “An express warranty is contractual in
nature,” and “its terms are therefore construed in accordance with their plain
meaning.”15
III. Case Facts
The oil tanker, Athos I, spilled heavy crude oil into the river because an
anchor had been abandoned on the bed of the Delaware River. 16 As required
by OPA, owner Frescati paid the costs of oil-spill cleanups regardless of fault,
and the Federal Government reimbursed Frescati. The amount reimbursed
exceeded a statutory limit by the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund: the statutory
limit here is $45 million, and Federal Government has reimbursed Frescati
$88 million. 17 Then Frescati and the Federal Government brought a suit
against CARCO and others which had chartered the Athos I for the voyage
that occasioned the oil spill, alleging CARCO had breached a contractual
“safe-berth clause,” and as a result of the alleged breach of contract. Frescati
also sought recovery of the cleanup costs not reimbursed by the Fund, while
the Federal Government (the United States) claimed recovery of
reimbursement it had paid to Frescati. 18
As the Supreme Court recognized, there was a provision in the charter
contract among Frescati, Star Tankers,19 and CARCO, which is “customarily
known as a safe-berth clause,” and is a “standard feature of many charter
parties.”20 The provision language in this case stated as following: “[t]he
12. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §202 (Am. Law Inst., 1981); UCC §§1-205,
2-208 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1951, § 1 revised in 2001).
13. See 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 30:6 (4th ed.).
14. 22 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 58:11.
15. Allen v. Roberts Const. Co., 532 S.E.2d 534, 570–71 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
16. CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1085.
17. Id. at 1087.
18. Id.
19. Star Tankers is an operator of tanker vessels. It had contracted with Frescati to charter
the Athos I before and then Athos I was sub-chartered to CARCO.
20. CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1086.
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vessel shall load and discharge at any safe place or wharf . . . which shall be
designated and procured by the Charterer, provided the Vessel can proceed
thereto, lie at, and depart therefrom always safely afloat, any lighterage being
at the expense, risk and peril of the Charterer.”21
The issue here is whether the safe-berth clause constitutes a warranty of
safety, which would impose the liability on the charterer, CARCO, for an
unsafe berth regardless of CARCO’s diligence in selecting the berth. 22 The
Supreme Court held yes.23
IV. Court Decision
The Supreme Court recognized that there were two conflicting lower court
decisions: Orduna, 913 F.2d 1149 and Paragon Oil Co. v. Republic Tankers,
S. A., 310 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1962). 24 Actually, there were a lot more
conflicting circuit court opinions discussing this specific issue, and the
circuit courts largely diverged.25
The majority admitted that the subject contract did not use the word
“warranty” explicitly. 26 However, the majority emphasized the importance
of the plain language of a contract. The majority analysis started from
dictionary meaning of “safe” and “always,” holding the language of the
safe-berth clause was “unqualified,” and the charterer’s duty under the
safe-berth clause was “absolute.”27 Therefore, the safe-berth clause was a
warranty of safety, and CARCO had breached the contract.28
The majority also analyzed the materiality of the safe-berth clause to
support its reasoning: the majority pointed out that in Davison v. Von Lingen
(The Whickham), 113 U.S. 40 (1885), the Supreme Court held that it is
irrelevant what label the parties put in the contract, and the “[s]tatements of
fact contained in a charter party agreement relating to some material matter
are called warranties.”29 As “the safety of the selected berth is the entire root
of the safe-berth clause,” the Supreme Court reasoned, “the safe-berth clause
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1087.
25. See Orduna, 913 F.2d at 1156-57 (summarizing the opposite reasoning and holdings
among circuit courts and district courts, and even by the same court in different cases).
26. CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1088.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1089 (quoting 22 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 58.11, at 40–41 (2017)
(bracketing in opinion).
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contains a statement of material fact regarding the condition of the berth
selected by the charterer.”30
The majority in CITGO went even further, clarifying that contract law is
strict liability. The majority adopted the Second Restatement’s theory and
made a straightforward comment distinguishing liability in contract law and
liability in torts.31 Therefore, whether the breaching party was at-fault or
careless is irrelevant: a breaching party’s due diligence will not help them off
the hook. It is rare for the Supreme Court to be so blunt in its adoption of
strict liability to contracts. The Supreme Court tried to temper this with
potential flexibility: the strict liability is just the default rule, and the parties
can deviate from the default rule to at-fault rules into the contracts based on
negotiations.32
CARCO referred to another term, “general exceptions clause” in the
subject contract, which exempts it from liability due to “perils of the seas.”33
CARCO also hoped to use that general exceptions clause to show the intent
of the parties to not impose liability when damages occurred because of
perils of the seas.34 The majority made a convincing disagreement, that the
general exceptions clause, as itself specified, does not apply when there is a
term in the subject contract that provided otherwise. 35 Further, the majority
clarified that the language in one clause is not a persuasive way to show the
parties’ intent on another clause. 36
V. Analysis
A. Contract Law Perspective
1. The majority’s arbitrariness and the dissent’s mistake
Given that both the majority and the dissent focused on contract
interpretation, let’s discuss this case from the contract law perspective first.
Contract interpretation generally requires a prerequisite that there is an
ambiguity in the language of the disputed term. If the language is ambiguous,
the meaning of the contract is a question of fact, and the court will allow
parties to introduce extrinsic evidence to show the parties’ actual intents and
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1089.
Id (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts §202).
CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1089.
Id. at 1090.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the meaning they used at the time of contract formation. If the language is not
ambiguous, then the court must follow the contract language itself to
interpret the term, where extrinsic evidence will not be allowed. 37 Both the
majority and the dissent concluded that the clause was unambiguous. 38
However, the majority held that the safe-berth clause was a warranty of
safety “at face value,” while the dissent held that “the plain language of the
safe-berth clause contained no warranty of safety.”39
The majority seems too confident in interpreting the term language, and
interestingly, the majority seems careless when applying the “plain language”
strategy. The majority explicitly admitted that there was no use of the word
“warranty” in the safe-berth clause, but it could be deemed as a warranty
“regardless of the label ascribed in the charter party.” 40 However, the
majority could not discern any language “hinting at” due diligence or related
at-fault theory, but it held that the omission of that language should be
deemed no due diligence required. 41 Given the flexibility in determining
whether missing words were implied, the “plain language” strategy used by
the majority seems not persuasive.
Moreover, in order to interpret the plain language of the safe-berth clause
favoring the majority’s own reasoning, and keep the contract interpretation
limited in the “unambiguous” circle, the majority chose to look at the
contract as a whole at will. While discussing the missing phrase “due
diligence” the majority tried to perceive the contract as a whole. The majority
held that the due diligence requirement was not implied, as other terms in this
contract explicitly used “exercise of due diligence,” and if the parties
intended to do so they would easily put due diligence limitation into the
safe-berth clause.42 On the contrary, as the dissent pointed out, the majority
did not recognize that other terms in this contract also explicitly used
“warranty,” but concluded directly that a missing word “warranty” was
implied.43 In fact, the two important missing words—“warranty” and “due
diligence”—are strong indications that the language of safe-berth term is
actually ambiguous. Random usage of the two important missing words in
other terms could be another strong indication that ambiguity exists in the
safe-berth clause. The divergence between the majority and the dissent on the
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1088.
Id. at 1089, 1094.
Id. at 1092, 1094.
Id. at 1088–89.
Id. at 1090.
Id.
Id. at 1095.
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plain meaning of the safe-berth clause yet again reinforces that the language
was indeed open to different interpretations.
Meanwhile, the dissent made a mistake in terms of the law of contract
interpretation. The dissent suggested to “remand for factfinding on whether
industry custom and usage establish such a warranty in this case,” and
criticized the majority’s opinion was a “judicial pronouncement on a
question of fact.”44 If the language is not ambiguous, then the meaning is not
a question of fact, warranty is not established, and the dissent would remand
for factfinding on whether CARCO was careful, acted reasonably, and
successfully exercised due diligence to designate a safe berth before or at the
time of the oil-spill incident. The dissent’s remand for factfinding on whether
industry custom and usage establish a warranty should follow a holding that
the plain language in the safe-berth clause is ambiguous, because according
to the law of contract interpretation. Only ambiguity makes it necessary to
introduce extrinsic evidence, including the industry custom and usage, to
show the parties’ intent.45
2. Law of contract interpretation
a) Four-corners test and Corbin test
To examine the existence of ambiguity, there are two well-known
theories: the four-corners test, by Professor Samuel Williston, 46 and the
Corbin test, by Professor Arthur Corbin. 47 The four-corners test, adopted in
some states, is relatively stringent, requiring only facial integration of the
contract, and “[t]he only criterion of the completeness of the written contract
as a full expression of the agreement is the writing itself.”48 The Corbin test,
adopted by other states, is more flexible. It determines the integration of a
contract based on circumstances such as the situation of the parties, the
subject matter, and purposes of the transaction. 49 The two tests were

44. Id. at 1094, 1098.
45. It is possible that the dissent tended to apply the Corbin test here. The Corbin test
generally allows extrinsic evidence in earlier to show the parties’ intent, at the phase of
determining if the contract language is ambiguous. But the dissent did not make it clear
whether they applied the test in the dissenting opinion. (Further, please see subsection 2. Law
of determining ambiguity.).
46. 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 30:6.
47. 3 CORBIN OF CONTRACTS § 574 (1960).
48. Thompson v. Libbey, 26 N.W. 1, 2 (Minn. 1885).
49. Bussard v. Coll. of St. Thomas, Inc., 200 N.W.2d 155, 162 (Minn. 1972); See also,
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §214.
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originally developed for the parol evidence rule, but can also be used in
contract interpretation.
In Angus Chemical Co. v. Glendora Plantation, Inc., the Fifth Circuit
applied the four-corners test in contract interpretation, holding “[t]he words
of a contract must be given their generally prevailing meaning” and that
“[w]ords susceptible of different meanings must be interpreted as having the
meaning that best conforms to the object of the contract.”50 In Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., the Supreme Court of
California adopted the Corbin test instead, holding “the test of admissibility
of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument is
whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the
language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.” 51 Therefore, the
Supreme Court of California allowed the introduction of extrinsic evidence,
not only to determine the parties’ intent to explain the meaning of the
ambiguous term, but also to determine whether the subject term is
ambiguous. Under this test parties are allowed to introduce relevant extrinsic
evidence to show the parties’ intent at the time of contract formation; if
parties fail to prove that the subject term is ambiguous by extrinsic evidence,
then the court will rule that no ambiguity exists.
It is obvious that the Supreme Court still adopted the four-corners test as it
explicitly cited Williston frequently. Based on the four-corners test, the
majority in CITGO gave no concern to extrinsic evidence, which is
consistent with its prior opinion Oelricks v. Ford that when there is no
ambiguity or uncertainty, introduction of extrinsic evidence, including usage
of trade or custom, is not allowed. 52
When looking at the four-corners test closely, the majority’s reasoning is
not plausible: the subject charter contract is obviously complete, intended to
be final, and much more sophisticated than most contracts as it is a standard
contract. The generally prevailing meaning of “safe” and “always,” which
the majority relied on will not help resolve the dispute on whether charterer’s
fault is required; missing both “warranty” and “due diligence” makes the
explanation of “safe” and “always” more susceptible to different meanings,
and the majority never examined which meaning best conforms to the object
of the contract.53

50. 782 F.3d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2047, 2048
(1984).).
51. 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968).
52. 64 U.S. 49, 63 (1859).
53. CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1088.
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If we follow the Corbin test, the majority should refer to extrinsic
evidence concerning ambiguity as well as the parties’ intent. The majority
merely scratched the surface of the parties’ intent when discussing whether
the safe-berth clause contains a statement of material fact, which will be
discussed in below.
b) Plain language rule
To determine whether ambiguity exists, the Supreme Court heavily relied
on the ordinary meaning of the contract language at face, which is the “plain
language” rule. Neither the majority nor the dissent denied the application of
the plain language rule. To the contrary, they both emphasized the
importance of applying the plain language rule, but they were disputed on
what the ordinary meaning of the contract language at face. However, the
plain language rule is not supposed to be such a hard or arguable rule for the
Supreme Court to apply. The controversy of how to apply the
non-controversial plain language rule, put the courts in an awkward
situation: they might have disagreement, either between the majority and the
dissenting Justices or between the lower courts and the higher courts, on an
English language issue. Furthermore, the plain language rule requires an
objective standard, which is a matter of law, not a matter of fact, and the
disagreement makes it even more subjective. 54 There should be some more
specific rules, or at least some tendencies, affirmed by the Supreme Court, to
limit the English language disagreement on the application of the plain
language rule.
Actually, the definition of unambiguity, as well as ambiguity, is narrow.
“A contract is ambiguous if indefiniteness of expression or double meaning
obscure the parties’ intent.”55 In state courts it has been well established that
contract language is unambiguous if there is only one reasonable meaning,
and “[w]hen any aspect of a contract is capable of more than one meaning, it
is ambiguous.” 56 Courts will not consider extrinsic evidence if “ordinary
meaning of the language leaves no room for ambiguity.”57
54. See Dennis v. Fire & Police Emps. Ret. Sys., 890 A.2d 737, 747 (Md. 2006)
(explaining that “the true test of what is meant is not what the parties to the contract intended it
to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it
meant.”).
55. Four B Properties, LLC v. Nat. Conservancy, 2020 WY 24, ¶ 33, 458 P.3d 832, 842
(quoting Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Summit Well Serv., Inc., 2002 WY 172, ¶ 19, 57 P.3d 1257,
1262.).
56. See, e.g., Voyager Life Ins. Co., Inc. v. Whitson, 703 So. 2d 944 (Ala. 1997); 100 Inv.
Ltd. P’ship v. Columbia Town Ctr. Title Co., 60 A.3d 1 (Md. 2013); Caldas v. Affordable
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In CITGO, based on the case facts, the contract language itself, and the
different explanations from the majority and the dissent, it is hard to say there
is only one reasonable meaning, hard to say that the ordinary meanings of the
contract language have no room for ambiguity. The contract language allows
room for a different meaning that the safe-berth provision has imposed and
only imposed a standard of conduct on the charterer, to select berth where the
Athos I can come and go “always safely afloat,” but does not express any
substantial liability or restrictions explicitly. Simply stating the standard of
conduct does not impose a strict liability on CARCO, and cannot show that
CARCO intended to undertake such warranty for safety of the berth when the
contract was formed.
“The test for determining whether a term is ambiguous is that common
words in a written contract will be given their ordinary meaning unless
manifest absurdity results or unless some other meaning is clearly evidenced
from the face or overall content of the contract.”58 In McConnell, the Court
of Appeals of Ohio held that Appellant’s interpretation goes beyond the plain
language of the agreement because it “adds words or meanings not stated in
the provision.”59
In CITGO, both the majority and the dissent added words or meanings to
the provision. The dissent added the “due diligence” requirement to the
provision, when the provision mentions nothing about fault, reasonable
efforts, or “due diligence.” The majority also added the meaning of
“warranty” to the provision when neither party explicitly stated anything
close to assuring the safety of the berth. The majority tried to justify its
reasoning by broadly extending the meaning of “always safely.” This is
unpersuasive because the contract at issue is a sophisticated maritime
contract, and normally the parties tend to use words more sophisticated and
professional to describe warranty. 60 Contrary to the Supreme Court’s
reasoning, warranty is accompanied with a much more stringent obligation,
which cannot be reasonably inferred from those two simple words of “always
safe.” When people use “always” and “safe” in ordinary life, they don’t
normally intend to assure anything or assume any obligation. It is

Granite & Stone, Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 2012). See also 17A AM. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS §
338.
57. Four B, 458 P.3d at 842.
58. McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enter., 725 N.E.2d 1193, 1206 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
59. Id.
60. CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1095. (As the dissent mentioned, the parties used “warranty” for
other provisions.)
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unreasonable to create such a heavy obligation 61 to one party by simply
stating “always safe,” without further details. For example, in Wayne J.
Griffin Electric, Inc. v. Dunn Construction Co. the Supreme Court of
Alabama held there is no ambiguity when the words of a release (the contract
at issue in Wayne) relieve the other party from “any and all claims.” 62 This
case is different from CITGO, because “any and all claims” is a much clearer
legal term to describe its scope, while “safe” and “always” cannot reach such
a level of certainty. Therefore, the provision itself should be considered as
broad, too simple, and too vague, it allows two or more different meanings,
and lacks explicit requirements or details, therefore it is ambiguous.
The majority recognized that the charter contract the parties used is a
standard industry form contract called the ASBATANKVOY form,
published by the Association of Ship Brokers & Agents (USA) Inc. trade
association.63 As the dissent pointed out, it is also worth noting that trade
association “specifically acknowledged” that the ASBATANKVOY form,
“the clause does not specify whether the charterer absolutely warrants the
safety of the berth.” 64 The majority’s holding is directly contrary to the
creator’s intent of the subject contract form.
3. Law of Warranty
The majority focused on the materiality of the safe-berth clause, and cited
The Whickham case and WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS to support its holding. 65
However, the majority overestimated the importance of materiality. The rule
the majority cited simply states that whether a provision is a warranty should
not be decided by what label the parties put on it, but it is not sufficient to
recognize the safe-berth clause is a warranty. WILLISTON simply states that
the definition of warranty is “[s]tatements of fact contained in a charter party
agreement relating to some material matter.”66 It aims to draw a line between
warranty and representation, in case the party who makes the statement
would carry unreasonably broad duty. It is also arguable that the safe-berth
clause is a statement of fact or not, as it simply states what CARCO should
do, nothing related to factual statements such as vessel’s condition or berth’s
61. The warranty itself is a strict liability, and the content of a warranty is the safety,
which generally requires more efforts to comply with.
62. 622 So. 2d 314, 317 (Ala. 1993).
63. CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1086.
64. Id. at 1095–96 (citing Brief for Maritime Law Association of the United States and
the Association of Ship Brokers & Agents (USA) Inc. as Amici Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 19).
65. CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1088–89, 1091.
66. 22 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 58.11.
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condition. As for The Whickham case, it is not relevant enough, as the
Supreme Court in The Whickham focused on construing the contract with
extrinsic evidence, under the situation where the contract is ambiguous,
which is a different step of contract interpretation. 67
The majority briefly mentioned the parties’ intent when it discussed
whether the safe-berth clause contains a statement of material fact. The
majority simply stated “[u]nder any conception of materiality and any view
of the parties’ intent, the charterer’s assurance surely counts as material,”
with no further explanation and supporting records. 68 Even assuming the
majority’s conclusion on materiality is reasonable, to the extent that the
safety of the selected berth is the “entire root” and the “very reason” for the
parties to include the safe-berth clause, the conclusion of “charterer’s
assurance” is still premature, as the majority made such a conclusion only
based on that safe-berth clause was “not subject to qualifications or
conditions,” which is exactly the disputed issue here. 69 Therefore, more
discussion is definitely necessary, and the majority should not have made
such an absolute conclusion that “no doubt” a warranty of safety was
established by “express warranty language.” 70
The dissent recognized the weakness of the majority’s “independent legal
theory” of materiality when determining the existence of warranty. 71 Further,
the dissent pointed out that even assuming the safe-berth clause contained a
statement of fact, it is a matter of fact to determine whether it is material.72 It
is a general rule adopted by the Supreme Court as well as state courts that it is
a question of fact for the jury to determine whether a representation
constitutes a warranty.73
B. Admiralty Law Perspective
1. Master’s right of refusal
The dissent provided a different rationale: the master’s the right to refuse.
The dissent concluded that “the vessel master has a duty of discharge and
right of refusal, while the charterer has a right of selection and duty to pay for
lighterage,” but the majority disagreed on those rights and duties. 74 The
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

113 U.S. 40.
CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1088–89.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1097.
Id. at 1097–98.
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512 (1995).
CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1095.
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dissent did not explain further, but the Fifth Circuit in Orduna has explained
the relationship between the master’s right and the charterer’s obligation
clearly, that the vessel master is in a “better position to judge the safety of a
particular berth.” 75 The Fifth Circuit completely adopted Professor
Gilmore’s opinion in THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY. 76
In THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY Professor Gilmore criticized that courts
made an unfair decision and “go too far” to hold that a charterer is liable for
damages to the ship regardless of fault. 77 The vessel master has adequate
expertise and knowledge regarding navigation and the vessel, and usually on
the spot furnished with aids. Meanwhile the charterer has limited expertise or
knowledge about the vessel except its capacity, and the charterer usually is
not on the spot when the decision as to safety was made. Instead, the
charterer usually designates berth on commercial consideration. 78 Further,
the vessel master usually enjoys the clause, which frees him the obligation to
take his vessel to any unsafe berth: the master has the right to refuse to enter
into an unsafe berth, which totally exceeds the charterer’s power. 79
Even in the circumstances that the charterer is aware of the factors making
a port unsafe, such as the conditions at the berth that the vessel master has not
known or has no reason to know, the charterer can be held liable under “an
actionable wrong . . . to invite the ship without warning into a peril known to
him,” which is close to a tort claim, therefore it is not necessary to impose
liability to the charterer under the safe-berth clause.80 However, the majority
was not persuaded by Professor Gilmore’s theory: the majority found a
probable better position to bear liability is not sufficient, and Professor
Gilmore also admitted that his theory was not adopted by many courts.81 The
majority did not discuss further, and used the plain language rule as a shield
instead.82
Furthermore, the majority found the conflict between the vessel master
and the charterer’s rights and duties did not exist, holding that “[o]n its face,
the vessel master’s duty creates no tension with the charterer’s duty.” 83 The
75. 913 F.2d at 1156-57 (citing Grant Gilmore & Charles Black, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY
§ 4-4, at 204–06 (2d ed. 1975)).
76. Orduna, 913 F.2d at 1156-57.
77. THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, at 204.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 204–05.
80. Id. at 205.
81. CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1092.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1091.
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majority criticized the dissent’s reasoning that this double liability will create
contradictory warranties of safety, because the charterer carries the duty to
select the safe berth, and the vessel master, following the charterer’s choice,
“load and discharge” at the safe berth. 84 The dissent, on the other hand, cited
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995), and
United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 710 (11th Cir. 1998), to discover an
important contract principle that “no term of a contract should be construed
to be in conflict with another unless no other reasonable construction is
possible.” 85 The dissent further criticized that the majority “makes no
attempt to limit its expansive interpretive approach.” 86 Again, the majority
used the plain language rule as a shield and made no further discussion.
The majority did admit two important assertions: first, they “recognized
that similarly worded safe-berth clauses may implicitly denote a vessel
master’s right to refuse entry and the charterer’s resultant obligation to bear
the costs of that refusal.”87 Second, they admitted that it is a “common sense”
that “the vessel master implicitly has a separate, dueling obligation regarding
the safety of the berth, when the clause explicitly assigns that responsibility
to the charterer.”88 Based on those two admissions, it is hard to insist that
there is no conflict of rights and duties between the vessel master and the
charterer, which at least creates confusion in the contract. Without statute
and even without an undisputed contract provision, is it fair or necessary to
let two different parties both have the warranty of safety on one incident?
Before confusion is clarified properly, I doubt that imposing warranty duty
on the charterer is a plausible interpretation from the original plain contract
language.
2. Industry custom
It has been well established by the Supreme Court that the usage of trade,
as well as industry custom, can be used as extrinsic evidence to show the
parties’ intent.89 To answer whether industry custom can be introduced to
show ambiguity, the four-corners test and the Corbin test are discrepant.
Interestingly, the dissent has shown the inclination to adopt the Corbin test
and proposed to introduce custom or usage evidence to determine the parties’
intent, even though the dissent found the contract languages’ plain meaning
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1091.
Robinson v. United States, 80 U.S. 363 (1871).
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was not ambiguous and did not contain a warranty of safety. 90 Therefore, the
dissent suggested a remand for factual findings on the question “whether the
parties entered into the charter party with knowledge of an established
custom or usage,” instead of a remand for factual findings on whether
CARCO has successfully exercised due diligence to designate a safe berth
before or at the time of the oil-spill incident.91
C. Public Policy Perspective
The majority resolved a long-term controversy, overruled Orduna, and
established a rule of safe-berth clause: it is a warranty of safety regardless of
fault, it is strict liability, but it could be overcome by mutual assent. The
majority tried to keep a balance, but its impact is unknown: at least it is unfair
to CARCO in this case, and in the future, what the business in the oil and
maritime field would react is unknown.
I would like to point out that justice and fairness in every single case is as
important as the future impact the decision may create. The Supreme Court
should be more careful in determining whether the language is ambiguous or
not, because it is the very first step for contract interpretation. It is absolutely
simple for courts to hold that there is no ambiguity in a contract, so they don’t
need to look at extrinsic evidence. It is harder and may create more
uncertainty to introduce extrinsic evidence, but it at least gives the parties the
opportunity to provide evidence before the court or jury, to show their intents
and mutual assent at the time of contract formation.
In this case, the contract language is at least not obviously unambiguous,
and we could see the ambiguity from the dissenting opinion, and the treaty
interpretation, as well as the customary understanding. The Supreme Court
seemed really reluctant to determine the contract language was ambiguous,
as both the majority and the dissent wanted to fix the dispute on the plain
language step. Ironically, the majority and the dissent interpreted the
“unambiguous language” in an opposite way, which exactly indicates that an
actual ambiguity existed. Because the Supreme Court was reluctant to hold
that actual ambiguity exists, the case holding in CITGO is unfair to CARCO
as a charterer, who is not an expert in choosing a safe berth, may not be at the
spot when the oil spill incident occurred, and possibly has no knowledge that
the vessel master has made the decision to enter an unsafe berth. Furthermore,
there might be extrinsic evidence showing mutual assent that both parties
expressly or implicitly agreed that the safe-berth clause assurance is
90. CITGO, 140 S. Ct. at 1094, 1098–99.
91. Id. at 1099.
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fault-basis, or there might be customary evidence showing that most
negotiation on safe-berth clause in this maritime industry is based on the
presumption of due diligence. Unfortunately, CARCO had no opportunity to
provide such evidence.
As mentioned above, the double warranty duties of the charterer and the
vessel master set forth in CITGO, although they are not conflicting, they may
at least lead to confusion, in determining who will ultimately owe the
warranty duty. If the vessel master refused to operate on the berth the
charterer has selected, the charterer may be held liable for a third-party’s
fault, and the charterer has no remedial measures to control such liability.
Without statute, or substantial policy consideration, it is unfair to the
charterer for having a warranty of safety when the conduct of a third party
who the charterer cannot control, is crucial to the warranty.
As the Fifth Circuit held in Orduna, “no legitimate legal or social policy is
furthered by making the charterer warrant the safety of the berth it selects.” 92
Not imposing the charterer strict liability would not increase the risks of
safety because the vessel master has the freedom to refuse an unsafe berth. 93
On the contrary, “[s]uch a warranty could discourage the master on the scene
from using his best judgment in determining the safety of the berth.” 94 When
all the public considerations for interpreting the safe-berth clause to a
warranty fail, what left is the confusion of liability leading to unfairness to a
non-fault party.
VI. Conclusion
According to the law of contract interpretation, the contract plain
language is ambiguous. Either by applying the four-corners test or the Corbin
test, the safe-berth clause is capable of having more than one reasonable
meaning. There are several indications that ambiguity exists: the missing
words “warranty” and “due diligence” in the safe-berth clause, the random
use of the missing words in other terms, and the divergence between the
majority and the dissent of the plain meaning. The materiality of the
safe-berth clause will not help it become a warranty. When recognizing the
safe-berth clause as a warranty, double warranty duties of the charterer and
the vessel master are in conflict. The failure to introduce extrinsic evidence
showing the parties’ intent is unfair to CARCO in CITGO, and due to the
charterer’s lack of expertise, recognizing the safe-berth clause as a warranty
92. 913 F.2d 1149, 1157 (5th Cir. 1990).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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makes the charterer suffer liability of injury when the charterer acted
prudently without fault or when a third party such as the vessel master acted
carelessly. When public considerations are not substantial enough to prevail
over the misapplication of law, only confusion and unfairness is left.
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